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Securing Democracy? A Comparative Analysis of 
Emergency Powers in Europe 
 
Anna Khakee 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is widely agreed that, at present, states and societies face a number of complex 
(and partly new) threats and challenges, including pandemics, terrorist attacks, 
transnational organised crime, sudden and large scale population flows, as well as 
natural catastrophes resulting from global warming.1 Political leaders often do not 
know how to tackle such multi-faceted and unfamiliar challenges, in particular if 
they emerge suddenly and take on large proportions. As a consequence, the reflex 
of resorting to emergency powers –  i.e. to grant the government extraordinary 
powers beyond its normal constitutional role – can be strong in such situations. 
Declaring a state of exception does, however, come at a cost. In the past, 
emergency powers have virtually always implied limits on individual human rights 
and, while intended to secure the survival of the state, such extensive executive 
powers have not always secured the survival of democracy.2 In other words, the 
risk of an undermining of the state’s constitutional order, and in particular the role 
of parliament, the judiciary and other oversight bodies, always looms. 
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, there is an ongoing debate in the United States on 
how to safeguard civil liberties and the system of checks and balances, given what 
has been called the “creeping imposition of emergency rule” after the events of 11 
September 2001.3 Similarly, in France, there has been a heated discussion about 
the government’s decision to impose a state of emergency (état d’urgence) in 
response to the unrest in the suburbs of Paris and other French cities in late 2005. 
Lately, Germans have been debating whether their constitution gives sufficient 
guidance and coverage in the case of another event similar to 11 September on the 
German territory, and in Italy in recent years, states of emergency have been used 
on occasions when there has been an unusually large influx of migrants – a hot 
topic in current Italian politics. 
 
                                                 
1  The author wishes to thank Anders Eka from the Working Committee on Constitutional Reform at the Swedish 
Ministry of Justice for entrusting her with the task of comparing the European regulations on states of 
exception in view of possible changes to the Swedish constitution. Many thanks also go to Hans Born, Derek 
Lutterbeck and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. The 
author is grateful to Oliver Diggelmann and Daniela Thurnherr for kindly pointing her to Swiss sources of 
information. She also wishes to thank Wendy Robinson at DCAF for a very thorough editing of the report. Any 
errors of fact or interpretation are solely the responsibility of the author. 
2  For a good introduction to the problems and issues surrounding emergency rule, see DCAF (2005). ”States of 
Emergency” Backgrounder on Security Sector Governance and Reform, Geneva: DCAF (Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of the Armed Forces), October. 
3  For a good overview of the American literature on the topic, see Scheuerman, William E. (2006). “Emergency 
Powers and the Rule of Law After 9/11” Journal of Political Philosophy, 14:1, pp 61-84. 
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As these few examples indicate, emergency powers are being used in Europe 
today, and their use is often contested. In theory, emergency powers4 are those 
special prerogatives that a government or a president can resort to in 
extraordinary situations such as war, insurgency, terrorist attacks, or other severe 
threats to the state, environmental calamities, serious industrial accidents, 
pandemics or similar situations that threaten a great number of lives. It is 
commonly agreed that these powers should only be used in such extraordinary 
circumstances, and even then only to the extent that the situation requires. Reality 
is more complex, however, and as already mentioned, two aspects of emergency 
rule in particular are often problematic: (1) safeguarding the balance of powers, i.e. 
the powers of parliament and the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive, and (2) protecting 
human rights and the rule of law. 
 
This policy paper examines the regulation of the use of emergency powers in 
European states (encompassing EU member states, Norway and Switzerland), and 
attempts to assess to what extent and in what ways existing rules protect the 
democratic order. This is done by focusing on two interrelated sets of questions: 
Firstly, how has the tension between emergency powers on the one hand and the 
principles of democracy and human rights on the other, been resolved in 
European constitutions and other relevant legislation? Or, more concretely, what 
is the role of parliament – as the state institution at the heart of the democratic 
system – in declaring, supervising, and ending emergency powers? What rights and 
freedoms cannot be suspended even during a state of exception? To what extent 
and how is the survival of the democratic order ensured? The second question 
concerns the present-day security threats: to what extent are current emergency 
regulations adapted to today’s security challenges? Do European constitutions 
provide for a differentiated response to emergencies? These questions are 
important because if, in an emergency, a government is left without well-adapted 
constitutional tools, ad hoc or less suitable solutions may hastily be sought and 
those proposed may not offer enough safeguards for parliamentary and judicial 
oversight, as well as for the protection of human rights and the rule of law. 
 
The current debate on emergency rule – be it theoretical or policy oriented – is 
heavily influenced by a “classical” theoretician: the German pre-war philosopher 
Carl Schmitt, whose main assertion, crudely put, is that liberalism and exception 
cannot be reconciled. In Schmitt’s view, emergencies (which are ubiquitous) 
cannot be foreseen and constrained by law and will therefore require the exercise 
of absolute power: liberalism will always have to yield to authoritarian rule. 
Giorgio Agamben is perhaps the most widely cited theoretician on emergency 
powers post-9/11, and he follows Schmitt’s argument (without, however, 
adopting Schmitt’s pro-authoritarian prescriptive stances). In his State of Exception, 
Agamben claims that the state of emergency has become “the dominant paradigm 
                                                 
4  A number of terms are used to cover the various forms of extraordinary powers granted to governments in 
periods of crisis, such as “state of emergency”, “state of exception”, “state of alarm”, “state of siege”, 
“martial law” or even “times of war”. The author has tried to closely follow each state’s terminology. 
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of government in contemporary politics”, and, echoing Schmitt, that the state of 
exception necessarily implies operating outside of the laws and the legal order.5 
 
Schmitt has also coloured the more policy-oriented discussions on states of 
emergency after 9/11. While the “Schmitteans” argue that emergency powers 
necessarily fall outside the constitutional order, “anti-Schmitteans” maintain that 
emergency powers can, and should, be integrated into the state’s legal order.6 One 
example of a counter-Schmittean argument is that made by Bruce Ackermann. He 
suggests that post 9/11, the United States, which so far has not had any coherent 
body of rules regarding states of emergency, should consider creating what he calls 
an “emergency constitution”. An emergency constitution, in his view, is the best 
way to minimise the risk of a creeping, gradual, and permanent undermining of 
basic civil liberties in a society threatened by terrorism.7 In other words, 
Ackermann proposes creating legal boundaries and regulations circumscribing 
emergency rule, and offers his own, in many ways ingenious approach to do so. 
Oren Gross, also focusing on terrorism, argues against this, taking a more 
Schmittean position. He puts forward a solution that allows for emergency 
measures, but construes them as external to the law: decision-makers should 
publicly acknowledge that any emergency measures they adopt are extra-legal.8 In 
an even clearer reference to Schmitt, Mark Tushnet basically agrees: emergency 
powers, which are – in his view – by their very nature extra-constitutional, cannot 
be controlled by the democratic institutions, but only by a mobilised citizenry, 
standing up for democracy.9 To conclude, then, the more policy-oriented literature 
not only has Schmitt as a common reference point – either in a positive or 
negative sense – , but also shares some additional commonalities: a clear focus on 
terrorism; and a search for models appropriate in the US post-9/11 context in 
particular. If comparisons are drawn, they are mostly confined to Canada, Israel 
and the United Kingdom, and are brief.10 A European perspective and a more 
thorough comparison of current regulations in various European states have so 
far been lacking. 
 
                                                 
5  Cited in Scheuerman (2006), op cit. See also Johns, Fleur (2005). “Guantánamo Bay and the Annihilation of the 
Exception” The European Journal of International Law 16:4; Neal Andrew W. (2006). “Foucault in 
Guantánamo: Towards an Archaeology of the Exception” Security Dialogue, 37:1, pp.31-46; Prozorov, Sergei 
(2005). “X/Xs: Toward a General Theory of the Exception” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, pp. 81-112. 
6  In so doing, they come closer to another classical thinker on the subject, Clinton Rossiter (Rossiter, Clinton 
(1948 [2002]) Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern Democracies Princeton University 
Press 
7  Ackerman, Bruce (2004). “The Emergency Constitution” Yale Law Journal Vol.113 Vol. 113:1029 pp.1029-1091. 
8  Gross, Oren (2003). “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?” Yale Law 
Journal, No. 112, pp. 1011-1134. 
9  Mark Tushnet (2005). “Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism” in: The Constitution in Wartime: 
Beyond Alarmism and Complacency Durham: Duke University Press. 
10  This is also valid for someone like Kim Lane Scheppele, whose basic argument is comparative: she stresses that 
the reason why the international and national state of emergency imposed by the US after 9/11 was so 
forcefully rejected internationally is that “the international community has moved on from the Schmittean 
framework”. European states, learning the lessons from the horrors of Nazism, fascism, and communism, have 
carefully regulated emergency rule in their constitutions. However, as we shall see, she is able to justify her 
argument regarding European states of emergency being “filled up with more legal content” and legal 
guarantees because of her limited use of mainly the German constitution, omitting European states that do not 
carefully regulate states of emergency (Scheppele, Kim (2004). ”Law in a Time of Emergency: States of 
Exception and the Temptations of 9/11” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, No. 6, pp. 
1008, 1069, 1079). 
8 
 
This study seeks to fill this gap by providing an overview of the regulation of 
emergency rule in European constitutions, with a focus on how the tension 
between emergency powers on the one hand and the principles of democracy and 
human rights on the other has been resolved. It shows that European countries 
differ considerably as to their constitutional regulation of emergency powers. 
Some states – often those with an unhappy experience of emergency rule or 
authoritarian government in recent history, such as Germany, Greece, Portugal, 
Spain and some of the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe – have 
detailed constitutional rules to be applied in emergencies. Other constitutions, 
many of them Western European, contain very little on emergency powers. There 
are several reasons for this absence of constitutional regulations of emergency 
powers. Some European countries do not provide for states of exception per se in 
their legal systems. Instead, they have certain rules enabling speedier parliamentary 
decision-making or the delegation of some legislative powers etc., which can in 
principle be used in all kinds of circumstances when speed is of essence (say for 
example to respond to a sudden influx of illegal drugs or a surge in some other 
form of crime, in an economic crisis, or when a budget reallocation needs to be 
made quickly) and not only in serious emergencies, which is the focus of this 
study.11 Another reason for the absence of constitutional norms on emergency 
powers is that these are regulated elsewhere, by ordinary law or so-called organic 
law.12 A third reason is that emergency powers are guided not by law, but by 
unwritten rules (often labelled “doctrine of necessity”). 
 
European constitutions differ not only in terms of existence and scope of emergency 
regulations but also with regard to their contents: the role they give to parliament 
and other state bodies responsible for oversight during an emergency, the 
protection of fundamental freedoms, and safeguards for the survival of the 
democratic political order. The definition of threats also varies significantly, with 
some countries solely focused on more “classical” threats to the state such as 
foreign invasion and conventional warfare, while others include industrial 
accidents, natural calamities, or serious threats to the “constitutional order”. This 
study also highlights that the Schmittean debate on whether emergency powers are 
to be conceived of as extra-constitutional or as rule-bound is also reflected in 
European constitutions: some countries, such as Switzerland, Norway, and 
(arguably) France have adopted a conception of emergency powers as largely 
external to the law, while others, such as Germany and Spain, carefully regulate 
and circumscribe emergency powers in their constitutions and other legislation. 
 
The policy paper is divided into two parts: Section 2 provides an examination of 
the constitutional regulation of emergency powers across 28 European countries: 
here, the geographical focus is broad – including the EU states, Norway and 
Switzerland – but the analysis is confined to the texts of the respective 
constitutions. Section 3 digs deeper into the national systems. It comprises seven 
case studies (on Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom), which go beyond the constitutions and take into account other 
                                                 
11  Such constitutional rules regarding speedy decision-making hence fall outside the scope of this analysis. 
12  Organic laws have a special status in between the constitution and ordinary laws. 
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types of legislation as well as actual practice. The paper concludes with a series of 
policy recommendations. 
 
 
 
2. Constitutional Protection of the Democratic Order During 
States of Exception: No European Consensus 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
What does the regulation of emergency powers in European constitutions look 
like? How are potential emergencies defined? Do the constitutions contain 
different levels or forms of emergency powers? Who decides on the declaration of 
emergency powers, its duration, prolongation and end? Do the constitutions 
provide for parliamentary and/or judicial oversight and control of emergency 
rule? What basic constitutional guarantees are made for the preservation and the 
survival of the democratic order? Which human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are protected at all times (so-called non-derogable rights)? This section attempts to 
answer these questions as concerns the constitutions of the EU member states, 
Norway and Switzerland.13 It offers an analytical overview of how European 
constitutions regulate emergency rule, with more details regarding each individual 
constitution contained in a set of tables which feature in the annexe to this 
report.14 
 
It must be noted that, from an international law perspective, states are not free to 
shape their emergency legislation entirely as they wish. Many of the most 
important international human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), and (in the 
pan-American context) the American Convention on Human Rights, enumerate a 
number of so-called non-derogable human rights, which cannot be suspended in 
any circumstances, including during a state of emergency or in wartime. In the 
wake of the democratisation of large parts of Central and Eastern Europe after 
1989, recommendations regarding the constitutional regulation of emergency 
powers were also made by the Venice Commission within the Council of Europe. 
 
The list of non-derogable rights in the international instruments vary somewhat, 
but generally encompass the right to life, the prohibition of slavery and of torture 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as well as the principle 
of non-retroactivity of penal law (no crime without law). According to the Venice 
Commission, it is also crucial to maintain certain other rights during a state of 
emergency, in particular minimum guarantees against arbitrary detention, the right 
                                                 
13  The United Kingdom, lacking a written constitution, is not part of the analysis in this section: it is however 
treated in a case study in section 3. 
14  Surprisingly perhaps given the centrality of the document to a state’s constitutional order, official translations 
of European constitutions are of very varying quality, which has in certain instances made the analysis more 
difficult. 
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to a fair trial and to recourse to courts against acts and actions of the authorities 
wielding emergency powers. Moreover, rights should be enjoyed by everyone 
without discrimination.15 
 
The instruments also provide rules for how and in what circumstances emergency 
regulations which derogates from certain (derogable) rights can be established. 
According to the ECHR Art 15, derogations can only be made in times of “war or 
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation”, and the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe shall be kept fully informed (i.e. the convention 
establishes a system of notification). A number of qualifying criteria, developed in 
European Court of Human Rights case law, further restrain the usage of 
emergency rule.16 The same is true for the ICCPR Art 4.17 
 
On the question of the division of powers between branches of government and 
the preservation of the democratic order during states of emergency, however, the 
human rights instruments remain silent. The Venice Commission also avoids 
making recommendations in this area, confining itself to “matters touching upon 
human rights, because national legislation and regulations differ greatly on the 
institutional aspects of the problem”.18 Only limited guidance is given to national 
constitutional drafters and lawmakers regarding this important issue. This has also 
arguably contributed to the significant differences in constitutional models of 
emergency rule surveyed in this section. 
 
 
2.2 Types of States of Exception 
 
Emergency situations differ greatly: pandemics and natural catastrophes tend to 
have different effects and require different responses than insurgencies or 
attempted coups d’état. Terrorist attacks, again, will be different from severe 
economic crises or an armed aggression of a foreign state. This diversity of 
possible emergencies is one of the thorniest issues that constitutional drafters and 
scholars have had to grapple with. It is also one of the reasons why the debate 
(reviewed in the introduction to this report) on whether responses to emergencies 
can indeed be regulated by law is so fierce. Arguably, however, a system that 
allows for a differentiated approach (i.e. a more limited form of emergency powers 
in the case of, for example, a large scale industrial accident and more 
comprehensive forms of emergency rules for wartime etc.) is less prone to 
                                                 
15  Venice Commission – European Commission for Democracy through Law (1995). “Emergency powers” by Ergun 
Özbudun and Mehmet Turhan, in the series Science and technique of democracy No. 12 CDL-STD(1995) 012, 
Strasburg. http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1995/CDL-STD(1995)012-e.asp, “Recommendations”. 
16  As developed in the following leading cases: Lawless v Ireland (No 3) (1961) 1 EHRR 15; Askoy v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 18 December 1996, 23 EHRR 553; Brogan v. UK A 145 (1988) 11 EHRR 117; Brannigan and McBride 
A 258-B (1993) 17 EHRR 539. (The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this addition) 
17  See General Comment No. 29 of the Human Rights Committee on derogations during a state of emergency 
(article 4) [2001]. For a thorough discussion of the issues of non-derogable rights and the proclamation of a 
state of exception, see Chowdhury, Subrata Roy (1989). Rule of Law in a State of Emergency: The Paris 
Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency. London: Pinter Publishers and 
Fitzpatrick, Joan (1994). Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights during States 
of Emergency University of Pennsylvania Press. 
18  Venice Commission 1995, opt cit. “Recommendations”. 
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with a state of alarm dealing with natural disasters and the like, a state of 
emergency, and a state of siege/war.19 Uniquely, the Hungarian constitution 
mentions as many as five different states of exception, although the difference 
between them is not always clear. 
 
Given that the shape and form of future emergencies are difficult to predict, 
European constitutions generally do not provide detailed descriptions of the types 
of threats covered by the state (or states) of exception. Generally, formulas such 
as “threats to the constitutional order”, “serious and immediate threats to public 
order” or “threats to territorial integrity and independence” are preferred. If the 
enumerations are more specific, they tend to remain open-ended. Thus, in the 
Estonian definition of an “emergency” (the lowest level of the three states of 
exception in the Estonian system) – “a natural disaster or a catastrophe” – 
catastrophe is not further defined. At times, fairly specific threats (such as a coup 
d’état) are combined with more general wordings (“imminent threat against 
national security”) such as is the case in the Greek constitution where a state of 
siege can be declared “[i]n case of war or mobilisation owing to external dangers 
or an imminent threat against national security, as well as in case of an armed coup 
aiming to overthrow the democratic regime”. Interestingly, no European 
constitution makes specific mention of terrorism as a basis for proclaiming a state 
of emergency. 
 
 
2.3 Declaration, Prolongation and Termination of Emergency Rule 
 
Only a handful of European constitutions remain silent on how emergency rule is 
declared. In fact, declaration is one of the few aspects of emergency rule that is 
covered in the great majority of European constitutions (see Table A2.2). 
According to most European basic laws that regulate the issue, parliaments must 
be involved in the decision to impose emergency rule. Most of the time, they act 
on a proposal or a declaration of the government or the president (however, in 
two cases, the Czech and the Irish constitutions, the parliament can act alone). 
Often, more stringent conditions apply to such a parliamentary decision or 
approval than to regular legislative acts: requirements of a larger majority and/or a 
majority of all MPs (not only those present) are common. An interesting 
exception can be found in the Polish constitution, whereby an absolute majority 
of votes (in the presence of at least half the statutory number of MPs) is required 
to annul the president’s decision on a state of emergency or martial law. 
 
Given that emergency rule must often be imposed without delay, supplementary 
rules exist in many European constitutions for the case that parliament cannot be 
rapidly convened. In such cases, it is often up to the government or the president 
to declare emergency rule, with parliamentary deliberation over the decision taking 
place at its next session. To avoid leaving the decision solely to the executive 
                                                 
19  Romania and Slovakia have also adopted a three-level system, but the types of threats that each of the levels 
are supposed to deal with have not been defined in the constitution. Other countries, such as France, also 
have a three-tier system although with differences in gradation and with one or two of the states of exception 
regulated only outside the constitution. 
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should the parliament be incapacitated, a few European states have sought 
alternative solutions. Thus, in the German case, it is up to the so-called Joint 
Committee (a kind of mini-parliament replacing the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
whenever necessary during a state of defence, see below section 2.4) to take the 
decision, and according to the Portuguese constitution, granting permission is 
conferred to the Standing Committee of parliament. The Hungarian constitution 
has adopted a slightly different model, with the speaker of parliament, the 
chairperson of the constitutional court and the prime minister jointly deciding 
whether the president should be entitled to introduce a state of emergency, a state 
of national crisis or a state of war in the parliament’s place. The parliament, in its 
first session, decides by a two thirds majority of all MPs upon the legality and 
necessity of the decision. 
 
In certain European constitutions, parliamentary involvement is weaker. In 
France, the president alone (after consultation with the prime minister, the 
presidents of the assemblies and the Constitutional Council) can impose the most 
far-reaching type of state of exception in the French system, the so-called 
exceptional powers. Similarly, in Slovakia, the president declares a state of 
emergency or a state of war on the proposal of the government, which should 
take its decision collectively. This solution is quite unusual, however. Often, pure 
executive decision-making is confined to the least serious forms of state of 
exception (used in case of a large-scale accident, pandemic, natural calamity, or the 
like), and in such cases, there is usually a constitutionally regulated time limit for 
its duration. 
 
Comparatively few European constitutions have explicit rules regarding the 
prolongation and termination of states of exception: almost half have no 
regulations at all; others have regulations that are much less detailed than those on 
the imposition of emergency rule (Table A2.3). Surprisingly, even certain 
constitutions such as the Hungarian one, that have detailed and even ingenious 
rules regarding the declaration of a state of exception, have left the issue of its 
prolongation and termination unregulated. In the cases where explicit 
constitutional rules exist, they often mirror regulations regarding the imposition of 
emergency rule: for example, in Ireland, it is the parliament that decides when a 
public emergency or a time of war or armed rebellion shall cease and in Slovakia, 
it is again the president, on the proposal of the government, who terminates a 
state of emergency or a state of war. It is also relatively common to set a time limit 
for a state of exception, without any further regulation. This begs the question of 
how to proceed if the emergency situation drags on beyond the constitutional 
time limit for emergency rule. 
 
As in many other areas of emergency regulation, the most stringent constitutional 
rules are found in countries with a relatively recent experience of authoritarian 
rule, such as Germany, Greece, Spain, and a handful of other countries. According 
to the German constitution, a Spannungsfall (the less serious of the two 
constitutionally regulated states of exception) is terminated whenever the 
Bundestag so decides. A Verteidigungsfall (state of defence) is terminated whenever 
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the Bundestag, with the approval of the Bundesrat, so decides. The Bundesrat can 
demand that the Bundestag deliberate the issue of termination. The Greek 
constitution stipulates a time limit of 15 days for a state of siege. It can be 
prolonged for 15-day periods by parliamentary decision, taken by absolute 
majority. According to the Spanish constitution, the time limit for a state of alarm 
is 15 days, whereas it is 30 days for a state of emergency. Congress decides on 
time limits for a state of siege. A state of alarm can be prolonged by Congress. A 
state of emergency can be prolonged for another 30 days, following the same 
procedure as for the proclamation of a state of emergency. 
 
 
2.4 Oversight and Maintenance of Democratic Institutions During a 
State of Exception  
 
It is perhaps in the area of oversight and regarding the workings of the democratic 
institutions during a state of emergency that European constitutions diverge the 
most. First, there are considerable differences regarding the extent of regulations: 
some constitutions are entirely silent on the effects of emergency powers on the 
role of the courts and on the balance between parliament, government and head 
of state, while others include very detailed systems of decision-making and 
transfer of powers (see Table A2.4). Second, there are big differences as to how 
emergency powers affect the balance of power and possibilities for oversight: In 
Bulgaria, for example, a Grand National Assembly takes on the functions of the 
parliament in an emergency. The Grand National Assembly has 400 deputies, 
while parliament has 240. An emergency thus perhaps paradoxically entails a 
parliamentary procedure that is potentially more cumbersome than in a normal 
state of affairs. The Portuguese constitution stipulates that a declaration of a state 
of siege or a state of emergency must not affect the constitutional responsibilities 
and functions of the main governing institutions, including the self-government 
bodies of the autonomous regions. In Slovakia, in contrast, the president shall 
dissolve parliament during war, or during a so-called “war state”20 or an 
exceptional state: the parliament hence ceases to function entirely. Oversight is 
instead confined to the Constitutional Court. 
 
Bulgaria and Slovakia are extremes, however. More common is the transfer of 
some powers by parliament to the government or the president, who has the right 
to issue regulations that go against existing laws. Also relatively common is 
speedier parliamentary decision-making and joint decision-making of both 
chambers of parliament. As a counter-balance, such laws and regulations are often 
temporary, and/or must be approved by parliament within a set period of time 
failing which they automatically lapse. 
 
                                                 
20  The official translation of the Slovak constitution is opaque and its terminology somewhat unusual. Moreover, 
the version of the Constitutional Court (http://www.concourt.sk/en/A_ustava/ustava_a.pdf), used here, 
differs in important respects from that of the government office (http://www.government.gov.sk/9714/the-
constitution-of-the-slovak-republic.php?menu=1297). The information on Slovakia must hence be treated with 
utmost caution. 
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A couple of constitutions stipulate that “mini-parliaments” replace the legislature 
during war or similar situations. This is the case in Sweden as well as in Germany, 
where, during a state of defence, the so-called Joint Committee can determine that 
the Bundestag cannot be convened or cannot reach quorum and that, as a 
consequence, the Joint Committee replaces both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
and exercises their rights as one body. The Swedish constitution provides for a 
similar so-called War Delegation. The Hungarian constitution contains provisions 
regarding crisis decision-making: it provides for a National Defence Council 
composed of the president, the speaker of parliament, the floor leaders of the 
political parties represented in parliament, the prime minister, the ministers, and 
the chief of staff of the armed forces with the right of consultation. In severe 
emergencies, the National Defence Council exercises the powers of the president 
and the government, as well as the powers transferred to it by the parliament. 
 
Approximately one third of European constitutions contain no provisions 
specifically designed to ensure the survival of the democratic order during states 
of exception, but the majority do (see Table A2.5). Some of the most common 
protective mechanisms concern the parliament as a key democratic institution. 
Given that elections and campaigning can seldom be conducted without severe 
disturbances in a serious emergency, many constitutions provide for the 
postponement of elections and the prolongation of parliamentary terms. Equally 
common is the compulsory convening of parliament rapidly after a state of 
exception has been proclaimed and the prohibition to dissolve the parliament. 
 
Another common safeguard is the prohibition to alter the constitution – and, in 
certain cases, other pieces of important legislation such as the election laws and 
the laws governing the state of emergency – during the state of exception. This is 
a way of trying to make sure that leaders who have become too fond of wielding 
extensive powers cannot alter the rules of the game to perpetuate their rule. 
Ireland is an outlier in this respect: In the case of war or armed rebellion, the 
constitution is practically suspended: “Nothing in this Constitution other than 
Article 15.5.2° [which forbids parliament to introduce the death penalty] shall be 
invoked to invalidate any law enacted by [the parliament] which is expressed to be 
for the purpose of securing the public safety and the preservation of the State in 
time of war or armed rebellion, or to nullify any act done or purporting to be done 
in time of war or armed rebellion in pursuance of any such law”. 
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2.5 Judicial Control and Oversight 
 
Relatively few European constitutions emphasise judicial control of the authorities 
wielding emergency powers: many are entirely silent on the issue. Two exceptions 
are the German and the Hungarian constitutions, which stipulate that the 
Constitutional Court must continue to function normally, even during emergency 
rule. In the German case, the only exception that can be made is where the Court 
itself decides that its working methods must be adjusted to the new situation. 
Only in one case (Slovakia) does the constitution explicitly provide for judicial 
controls: there, the Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of the 
proclamation of a state of emergency or a state of exception, as well as of 
measures subsequently taken by the emergency government. Given that the 
parliament is dissolved during states of exception in Slovakia (see above), the 
judicial control mechanism takes on even greater significance. 
 
Likewise, other alterations in the judicial system during emergency rule are not 
treated in detail in any European constitution. A number of basic laws mention 
the establishment of extraordinary courts or the extension of the jurisdiction of 
military tribunals (see Table A2.4). The right to appeal may also be restricted, such 
as in Italy as concerns sentences of the military tribunals. The Swiss constitution 
explicitly rules out creating ad-hoc tribunals, but many others remain silent on the 
issue.  
 
 
2.6 The Protection of Human Rights During States of Exception 
 
European constitutions as a rule fall into one of three categories as far as the 
protection of human rights during emergency rule are concerned.21 Some 
constitutions do not mention the issue at all, or stipulate that it should be settled 
in other types of legislation. The majority of states that fall into this category are 
Western European ones, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and Norway, 
but a few of the newer Central European democracies (Czech Republic, Latvia 
and Slovakia) also feature. 22 
 
Other constitutions, such as those of Austria, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, 
Netherlands, and Spain, list the rights that may be curtailed during emergency rule. 
The list of derogable rights vary somewhat from one country to the next, but 
often include the freedom of movement, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of 
association, free speech, secrecy of correspondence/ right to privacy, the sanctity 
of the home, and certain rights during arrest and/or trial. Uniquely, the Maltese 
                                                 
21  Due to space constraints, no table on the protection of human rights during states of exception is provided. 
The following constitutional articles were consulted for the analysis in this sub-section: AT Basic Law on the 
General Rights of Nationals art. 10; BG Const. art. 57.3; CH Const. art. 36.1, 3-4; DE Const. arts. 17a.2; 
115c.2; EE Const. art. 130; ES Const. art. 55.1; FI Const. art. 23; GR Const. art. 48.1; HU Const. art. 8.4; IE 
Const. art. 40.4.5; LT Const. art. 145; LU Const. art. 113; MT Const. arts. 34.5, 45.4.e; NL Const. art. 103.2; 
PL Const. art. 233.1; PT Const. art. 19.6; RO Const. art. 53; SE Const. Chapter 2 arts. 12-16, 23; SI Const. art. 
16; SK Const. art. 51.2. 
22  The constitution of Cyprus (art. 33.1) stipulates that “[s]ubject to the provisions of this Constitution relating 
to a state of emergency” fundamental rights and liberties cannot be further limited or restricted. As no such 
provisions as regards basic rights during a state of emergency are to be found in the constitution, it can be 
assumed that no restrictions can be made. 
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list of derogable rights includes the principle of non-discrimination. According to 
the German constitution, only four rights, namely freedom of movement, the 
sanctity of the home, compensation for expropriation, and certain rules regarding 
arrest (allowed for up to four days during a state of defence), are derogable. 
According to the Irish constitution, the protection against unlawful detention is 
curtailed during a state of war or armed rebellion; the constitution contains no 
further rules regarding restrictions of human rights during states of exception. The 
Romanian constitution admits that restrictions in certain rights are made, but the 
measure “shall be proportional to the situation having caused it, applied without 
discrimination, and without infringing on the existence of such right or freedom.” 
 
Following the model employed in the international conventions, a third set of 
constitutions, including those of Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and 
Slovenia, list rights which are non-derogable. Again, national variations as to the list 
of non-derogable rights are legion, but a common core can be discerned. It is 
virtually always the case that the right to life, the prohibition of torture and other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the non-retroactivity of 
penal law, are included. Other common non-derogable rights include the 
inalienable dignity of the person, right to citizenship, right to a fair trial or certain 
rights during trial, freedom of religion and belief, rights when under arrest, and, in 
the Estonian and Polish constitution, non-discrimination. Surprisingly, the 
prohibition of slavery and servitude (one of the non-derogable rights in the 
international human rights conventions) is remarkable by its absence. 
 
The Swiss constitution adopts a solution which is somewhat different from the 
others: it states that severe restrictions may only occur in the case of a serious, 
direct and imminent danger and must be proportional to the purpose. The 
“essence of basic rights” remains inviolable. The constitution of Luxemburg is in 
principle silent on the issue of non-derogable rights, but the general rule that none 
of the paragraphs of the constitution may be temporarily suspended should 
presumably apply to situations of emergency as well. 
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3. Legislation and Practice in Selected European States 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Section 2 showed that there are big differences between European states as to 
both the extent and content of constitutional regulation of emergency situations. We 
saw that countries such as Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and 
Spain have constitutional regulations on most of the main aspects of emergency 
rule, while the constitutions of – primarily Western European – states such as 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, 
Norway, and Switzerland are practically silent on the topic. Content-wise, 
differences are also important: according to some constitutions, proclamation, 
prolongation and termination of emergency rule are an executive prerogative, 
while in others, the role of the parliament is important. Similarly, some 
constitutions allow for increased executive prerogatives during a state of 
emergency, while others stipulate practically no changes in the balance of powers 
between the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. Variations are also 
considerable as regards the extent to which restrictions can be made in human 
rights and civil liberties during states of exception. 
 
This section explores these differences further through a series of brief case 
studies of legal regulations and practices in Finland, France, Germany, Norway, 
Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. It shows that the theoretical debate 
referred to in the introduction of this report – between those who, following Carl 
Schmitt, believe that emergencies can only be dealt with outside the constitution, 
and those who think that emergencies should be restrained and circumscribed as 
much as possible by law – is in fact not merely theoretical. As the case studies 
make clear, Europeans states come down on opposite sides of this debate. Two 
cases, in particular, are almost ideal-typical. Switzerland, on the one hand, has 
deliberately, by government decision, chosen not to adopt any written rules, 
constitutional or otherwise, for emergencies so as not to hamper the executive in 
its handling of a crisis. Rather, it relies on an extra-constitutional and un-codified 
“doctrine of necessity”, which stipulates that, in a severe emergency, the 
government may seize almost total power, leaving the parliament toothless. As 
shown in the previous section, the basic law of neighbouring Germany, on the 
other hand, sets forth detailed constitutional regulations of emergency powers that 
allow parliamentary involvement in the introduction and removal of emergency 
rule, both legislative and judicial oversight during a state of exception, and a 
virtually unaltered guarantee of human rights.  
 
Other states fall somewhere in between these two models of constitutionality vs. 
extra-constitutionality, and of checks and balances vs. unrestrained executive 
power. France and Norway come closer to the Swiss model as regards extra-
constitutionality and, in particular, when it comes to the vast powers transferred to 
the executive. Spain, in contrast, shares some basic similarities with the tight 
regulatory reins found in Germany, although they are partly provided for in the 
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constitution and partly in organic law. The UK system is subject to much 
controversy and interpretation but, like Finland, most likely falls somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum, as they offer a rules-based approach, but with weaker 
checks on executive power than in Germany or in Spain.23 
 
 
3.2 Switzerland and Germany: Extra-constitutional Carte Blanche vs. 
Tight Constitutional Limits  
 
As noted in section 2, the Swiss constitution does not provide for any state of 
exception per se. In the past, Switzerland has had written rules on the doctrine of 
necessity (droit de nécessité). However, in 2003, the Swiss government repealed 23 
legal acts that in one way or the other regulated this doctrine, on the grounds that 
they were old and had become purposeless (“sans objet”).24 Three years later, after 
an examination by the Federal Department of Justice and Police, the government 
concluded that a new, constitutionally grounded doctrine of necessity would be 
“laborious, pointless and not risk free”.25 Given that such legislation must be 
detailed, the government pointed out that it risked slowing down decision-making 
in situations when measures would have to be taken swiftly. It also believed that 
the Swiss federal structure would make it relatively easy to transfer competencies 
to the cantonal level were the federal institutions to become incapacitated, and vice 
versa. Moreover, the government feared that constitutional regulation of the 
doctrine of necessity would increase rather than decrease the risk of abuse of 
power: “it can be feared that written rules regarding the doctrine of necessity has 
the psychological effect that the authorities hesitate less to use such norms in 
exceptional situations”.26 
 
What remains in the case of Switzerland, then, is the extra-constitutional doctrine 
of necessity, based on the experience of the two World Wars. This doctrine may 
be relied on in severe crisis situations such as war or widespread natural disasters 
that make it impossible for the highest organs, and in particular the parliament, to 
function normally.27 According to the doctrine, the parliament, if it can be 
convened, will decide on a state of exception and on the transfer of absolute 
powers to the executive. If parliament cannot be convened, the government can 
itself declare a state of exception and take all necessary decisions, even including 
decisions that are unconstitutional.28  
 
During the two World Wars, the Swiss government relied extensively on the 
doctrine of necessity. In August 1914, the Swiss parliament decided to give the 
                                                 
23  Due to space constraints, this section does not include any in-depth analysis of how constitutional or other 
courts in the seven countries have ruled on the legality and scope of emergency powers. 
24  “Une nouvelle réglementation du droit de nécessité ne s’impose pas” Communiqués, Federal Department of 
Justice and Police, 16 June 2006 http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/fr/home/dokumentation/mi/2006/2006-06-
160.html 
25  Ibid, translation by the author. 
26  Ibid, translation by the author. 
27  Bellanger, François (2001). “Droit de nécessité et état d’exception” in Daniel Thürer, Jean F. Aubert Jörg P. 
Müller och Oliver Diggelmann (Eds.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, pp.1268-9; “Une nouvelle 
réglementation...” opt cit. 
28  Venice Commission opt cit “Concept of public emergency”, Bellanger, François opt cit p.1269. 
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government absolute powers to undertake those measures that were considered 
necessary to guarantee the unity, security and neutrality of the country. Based on 
this decision and until 1921 when the state of exception was lifted, the 
government and the ministries (federal departments) issued almost 1,400 
regulations, many of which were “illegal or unconstitutional”.29 During that time 
period, the supervisory role of the Swiss parliament was reduced.30 The situation 
was similar during the Second World War; with the difference that the 
government was unwilling to relinquish its extraordinary powers when the war 
had ended in what François Bellanger called an “abuse of the doctrine of 
necessity”.31 It was only in December 1950, after a popular initiative won the 
support of the majority of the population and of the cantons in a referendum, that 
the government was forced to do so. To summarise, then, the Swiss system for 
emergency rule is primarily extra-constitutional, and the non-codified doctrine of 
necessity allows for practically unrestrained executive rule. 
 
If the Swiss experiences of the use of emergency powers during the Second World 
War were somewhat unpleasant, those of Germany were disastrous. Paragraph 48 
in the Weimar Constitution famously made it easy to proclaim a state of 
emergency, and gave the president almost absolute powers–to restrict or abolish 
certain basic rights and to use the armed forces, for example–in such situations. 
During the turbulent inter-war years, Article 48 was invoked more than 250 
times,32 and in 1933 Hitler proclaimed a state of emergency which lasted until the 
end of the war in 1945.33 As a consequence, German post-war politicians (and 
Germans in general) were very reluctant to provide any constitutional basis for a 
state of emergency. In fact, they only did so as this was an allied precondition for 
granting Germany full sovereignty, and only in 1968 after ten years of 
discussions.34 
 
The amendments to the German basic law, entitled Notstandgesetze, are very 
detailed. They encompass aspects of emergency rule that few other constitutions 
(or even ordinary laws) touch upon, such as the exact tasks that can be transferred 
to the armed forces during a state of defence or a Spannungsfall (i.e. the protection 
of civilian property and, in certain well-defined cases, fighting organised and 
armed insurgents), the transfer of certain legislative powers and powers over the 
police from state to federal authorities, rules regarding finances during a state of 
defence, the promulgation of a proclamation of a state of defence, and rules 
regarding specific constitutional amendments authorised in the case of an 
international peace or defence agreement, or the gradual withdrawal of occupying 
                                                 
29  Bellanger, François opt cit p.1269. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid p.1270. 
32  Scheppele, Kim opt cit., p. 1008. 
33  Schweiger, Gaëlle (2005). “Die Notstandsverfassung” Studienarbeit GRIN Verlag für akademische Texte, 
Dokument Nr. V56999, Chapter. 1; Benda, Ernst ”Notstandsvervassung” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 
http://www.bpb.de/wissen/01800835942875274916993427085023,0,0,Notstandsverfassung.html; Jakab, 
András (2006). ”German Constitutional Law and Doctrine on State of Emergency – Paradigms and Dilemmas of a 
Traditional (Continental) Discourse” German Law Journal Nr. 5, 1 May. 
34  Schweiger opt cit. p.2. 
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powers. In the European context, Germany is unique in that this very detailed 
constitutional regulation makes additional federal laws virtually superfluous. 35 
These regulations also provide for far-reaching safeguards aimed at ensuring the 
continuity of the democratic system, with a crucial role for parliament in the 
declaration and termination of a state of defence, rules regarding the continued 
activities of the Constitutional Court, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, the 
replacement of the two houses of parliament by a Joint Committee – to ensure at 
least some parliamentary oversight in times of severe crisis when it proves 
impossible to convene both houses of parliament , the maintenance of the Federal 
Court of Justice as the highest court for appeals, etc. (these and other aspects are 
all further elaborated on in the previous section and in Annex 1). The fears of the 
post-war politicians and the German public have so far not materialised, as the 
Notstandsgesezte have not been used in Germany to date.36 Today, the laws are also 
fairly uncontroversial. To summarise, then, the German system offers very 
detailed constitutional regulations of emergency rule that allow for the continued 
functioning of the country’s main democratic institutions even during situations of 
emergency. 
 
 
3.3 Varieties of the Doctrine of Necessity: Norway and France 
 
While Switzerland and Germany can be characterised as almost ideal typical cases 
occupying two ends of a spectrum, other European countries have adopted more 
mixed models. Relatively close to the Swiss system are the French and Norwegian 
arrangements, although neither is as clear-cut. Contrary to the Swiss model, they 
have – in certain respects quite detailed – emergency regulations applicable in less 
serious emergency situations. However, similarly to the Swiss, both the French 
and the Norwegian system provide for a type of emergency rule that is virtually 
unlimited and (in the case of Norway) extra-constitutional as a last resort in 
serious emergencies. 
 
The Norwegian constitution, like the Swiss one, makes little mention of 
emergencies (see previous section and Annex 1). In contrast to the Swiss case, 
however, Norway has a Contingency Law which contains rules regarding decision-
making and the division of power in the case of a severe crisis such as war or the 
threat of war.37 The Contingency Law stipulates that if the Storting (parliament) 
cannot operate normally due to war, the King (in practice the government) is 
entitled to take all decisions deemed necessary to protect the country’s interests. 
The Storting shall be informed of such decisions as soon as possible, and 
immediately after its next session, the decisions will be automatically repealed. In 
war or when confronted by an immediate threat of war or a threat to the country’s 
                                                 
35  Thus, there are only a series of purely technical laws regarding energy and electricity supplies, air, rail, and 
sea traffic, postal services etc., (Notstandsgesetze http://www.rechtliches.de/Gesetze_17.html) as well as 
regulations for the rules of procedure of parliament and of the Joint Committee in the case of emergency rule 
(Geschäftsordnung für das Verfahren nach Artikel 115 d des Grundgesetzes, Geschäftsordnung für den 
Gemeinsamen Ausschuss). 
36  Benda, Ernst op. cit. 
37  Lov 1950-12-15 nr 07: Lov om særlige rådgjerder under krig, krigsfare og liknende forhold 
http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19501215-007.html 
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security or sovereignty, the King has the right to issue regulations with the force 
of law to ensure the country’s security, public order and health, supplies of vital 
goods, and military and civil defence. Such regulations may be contrary to existing 
laws, but the Storting should be notified about them as soon as possible and it will 
then immediately be convened. The Storting can repeal the regulations, but if it 
chooses not to, they should be turned into law through the proper parliamentary 
procedure. The law also contains specific rules applicable to areas of the country 
which have been cut off from government control due to war or other severe 
crises, and for the actual theatre of war. Penal laws can also change in situations of 
war, threat of war, or when the security or sovereignty of the country is 
threatened; however, the law does not mention which rights and freedoms are 
protected in such situations, nor does it encompass specific provisions aimed at 
protecting the survival of the democratic order. 
 
Although the Contingency Law gives the government extensive powers during a 
serious crisis, there is also an extra-constitutional doctrine of necessity, which 
potentially concentrates even more powers in government hands. According to 
this doctrine, based on practical historical experiences (mainly from the Second 
World War when Norway was occupied by the Nazis), “emergencies legitimise an 
action which under normal circumstances would imply a breach of the 
constitution”.38 The doctrine of necessity can only be used in a severe emergency, 
when crucial national interests would be jeopardised if the normal rules were 
adhered to. It generally implies that the government’s powers are extended, while 
those of the Storting are reduced or even eliminated, and that the normal rules for 
governmental decision-making need not be followed. Breaches of the constitution 
and of the Contingency Law are, as already noted, allowed.39 To summarise, then, 
the Norwegian system for emergency rule is a hybrid, with two sides: a legally 
regulated system giving parliament an important role in checking the emergency 
rule government on the one hand and, in a very severe crisis, the extra-
constitutional doctrine of necessity concentrating virtually all powers in the hands 
of the government, on the other hand. 
 
In contrast to Norway and Switzerland, France does not, strictly speaking, have a 
doctrine of necessity, but its presidential pouvoirs exceptionnels (exceptional powers) 
are, as we shall see, so wide-ranging and little regulated that, in practice, they bear 
great similarities to the necessity approach – with the important difference, 
however, that these sweeping powers are not extra-constitutional, but instituted 
through Article 16 of the French constitution.40 
 
France has three levels of emergency powers. Apart from the pouvoirs exceptionnels, 
there is the state of siege, regulated in paragraph 36 of the French constitution and 
in the Defence Law,41 and the state of emergency, regulated in the Loi instituant un 
                                                 
38  Andenæs, Johs. och Arne Fliflet (2006). Statsforfatningen i Norge, 10. utg. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, p. 502, 
author’s translation. 
39  Andenæs och Fliflet, opt cit., pp.503-6. 
40  For a thorough discussion on how to categorize the French system of emergency powers, see Saint-Bonnet, 
François (2001). L’Etat d’exception Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 5-28. 
41    Code de la défense, parti 2, livre I titre II http://www.defense.gouv.fr/defense/content/download/86693/ 
779255/file/ code_defense_legislatif_2007.pdf 
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état d'urgence of 1955 (this law hence predates the constitution).42 A state of siege 
can be proclaimed when there is an immediate threat due to a foreign war (guerre 
étrangère) or an armed uprising. The decision is taken by the government, but any 
prolongation beyond the initial 12 days must be authorised by parliament. The 
main effect of a state of siege is to transfer certain powers from civilian to military 
authorities. These include: the authority over the police and the responsibility for 
public order (including decisions on restricting freedom of assembly and 
introducing censorship); judicial powers in criminal law cases and in cases where 
the military authorities are being undermined; and increased policing powers, such 
as the right to search inhabitants’ dwellings at any time of the day or night). All 
other powers remain vested with the civilian authorities, and other constitutional 
rights and freedoms remain in force. 
 
The law instituting a state of emergency stipulates that a state of emergency can be 
proclaimed by the government in the whole or parts of the country (including the 
non-metropolitan departments d’outre-mer) in cases of immediate danger due to 
serious assaults on the public order or in situations that can be likened to a public 
calamity. As in the case of the proclamation of a state of siege, any prolongation 
beyond the initial 12 days must be authorised by parliament, which at the same 
time decides on the exact length of the state of emergency. During a state of 
emergency, the prefect (i.e. the state representative at the local, département, level) 
has the right to impose a curfew and certain other types of restrictions on the 
freedom of movement. The Minister of the Interior is entitled to take decisions 
regarding house arrests and order the seizure of certain types of weapons. In 
addition, the Minister of the Interior or the prefects can provisionally close all 
types of meeting places and prohibit gatherings that may disturb the public order. 
The decree proclaiming a state of emergency can also introduce censorship and 
allow night-time searches. 
 
The state of emergency bears a number of resemblances to the state of siege (as 
far as proclamation, prolongation, and restrictions in certain freedoms are 
concerned); the main difference is that, during a state of emergency, no powers 
are automatically transferred to the military authorities.43 Another difference is 
that, to date, the state of siege has never been used in France, while the state of 
emergency has been used on several occasions, both in the colonies (Algeria in 
1955 and New Caledonia in 1985) and in metropolitan France (most recently 
between 8 November 2005 and 4 January 2006, both during and after the civil 
unrest).44 
 
The state of siege and the state of emergency grant important, but circumscribed, 
powers to the government (or the military authorities in the case of the former). 
In contrast, the pouvoirs exceptionnels, regulated in paragraph 16 of the French 
                                                 
42    Loi numéro 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 instituant un état d'urgence http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/ 
loidu3avril1955EtatDUrgence.pdf 
43  Thénault, Sylvie (2007). ”L’état d’urgence (1955-2005): de l’Algérie coloniale à la France contemporaine” 
Mouvement social P 8° 1233 n°218, pp.63-78. 
44  Thénault, Sylvie opt cit., Ministère de l’intérieur et de l’aménagement du territoire Décret n°2005-1387 du 8 
novembre 2005 relatif à l’application de la loi n°55-385 du 3 avril 1955. 
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constitution, essentially gives the president a carte blanche of legislative and 
executive power.45 If there is an immediate and serious threat to the French 
institutions, independence, territorial integrity or the fulfilment of France’s 
international commitments, and its constitutional governmental authorities are no 
longer able to function normally, the president can decide to take on exceptional 
powers. Before taking such a decision s/he must consult the prime minister as 
well as the presidents of both chambers, and the Constitutional Council. The 
president also decides how long the exceptional powers should be in force. 
Paragraph 16 does not require a total collapse of the normal structure of 
government: the president can seize exceptional powers even if parliament, for 
example, is functional. Given these elements, paragraph 16 has long been 
controversial in France. A constitutional review committee of the early 1990s did 
not, however, believe that any alterations to the system were necessary; neither did 
the Conseil d’Etat a few years later.46 In sum, then, the French system combines 
two very different models of emergency power: the relatively well-regulated states 
of emergency and siege providing for certain checks and balances and for the 
protection of human rights, on the one hand, and, for very serious crises, the 
formidable and – à la Schmitt – hardly-regulated exceptional powers that the 
president can take on without any serious counter-balance, on the other hand. 
 
 
3.4 Spain: Closer to the German Model 
 
Not unlike Germany, 20th century Spain knew fascism, war, and dictatorship. Also 
like Germany, it has felt the need to carefully craft a series of regulations to 
circumscribe emergency rule. As was shown in the previous section as well as in 
Annex 1, the Spanish constitution contains relatively detailed regulations regarding 
the proclamation and prolongation of the three types of emergency rule that exist 
in the Spanish system: state of alarm, state of emergency, and state of siege (estado 
de alarma, estado de excepción and estado de sitio). It also establishes a relatively detailed 
set of safeguards to ensure the survival of the democratic order during emergency 
rule, and sets out limits for restrictions of basic rights and freedoms in such 
circumstances. In contrast to Germany, the Spanish constitutional regulations are 
not exhaustive, however, and the three exceptional states are further regulated in 
an organic law, the Ley Orgánica 4/1981. 
 
The Ley Orgánica 4/1981 spells out in detail the circumstances for which the 
three different types of emergency rule are designed. A state of alarm is 
proclaimed in parts or the whole of the country in cases of calamities or accidents 
such as earthquakes, flooding, or widespread fires; epidemics; disruptions in 
crucial public services (as long as such disruptions are not covered by the right to 
industrial action); and shortages in the supply of basic necessities. A state of 
emergency is proclaimed when the political system or public order is severely 
disrupted, and a state of siege in the actual case of or threat of insurgency or 
                                                 
45  Ackerman opt cit., pp.1038-9; footnote 19. 
46  Cited in Saint-Bonnet, François opt cit., pp. 374-5. 
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armed action directed against the country’s sovereignty, independence, integrity, 
or constitutional order. 
 
The three types of emergency rule are proclaimed following different modalities, 
where the stronger role of parliament in the case of a state of exception and a state 
of siege reflects the more serious implications that these two have on the life of 
the country and its institutions. The main implication of a state of alarm is, in fact, 
that the public authorities in the emergency area are put under government 
command (or, if the government so decides, under the command of the president 
of the autonomous region). During a state of alarm, circulation can be restricted in 
certain areas and during certain times, an obligation to work can be introduced, as 
can rationings and other means of ensuring the supply of basic necessities. 
Requisitions of property and industries of various kinds may also be made. 
 
A state of emergency touches individual rights and freedoms to a greater degree. 
For example, a person who on good grounds may be suspected of disturbing the 
public order can be incarcerated for a maximum of ten days. However, the right to 
a lawyer and to be informed of the reasons for the arrest must be upheld, and a 
competent judge must be notified within 24 hours. In similar fashion, the Ley 
Orgánica regulates the extent to which other rights and freedoms may be 
curtailed, if the Chamber of Deputies so admits: searches without a court order 
may be conducted, but only if certain rules regarding note-taking and the presence 
of parties are respected; censorship is allowed, but not prior censoring; the right of 
assembly may be restricted, but regular meetings of political parties, trade unions, 
and employers’ organisations cannot be forbidden, etc. When the disruption of 
the political order leads to, or occurs in conjunction with a calamity or an 
epidemic, etc., the government may also use the additional powers vested in it 
under a state of alarm. No other changes in the balance of powers are stipulated. 
 
The state of siege implies some possible further restrictions – again dependent on 
the prior authorisation of the chamber of deputies – of individual rights and 
freedoms (the right to a lawyer, right to know the reasons for arrest). The 
chamber of deputies may also decide that certain crimes are to be tried in military 
courts. However, the most important implication of a state of siege lies in the 
transfer of extensive powers to the military authorities. Again, this transfer is 
circumscribed in that the government shall appoint the executive military 
authorities, lead their activities, and continue exercising powers that have not been 
handed over. The Ley Orgánica 4/1981 has so far never been used. 
 
Thus, the relatively strongly regulated Spanish system focuses on protecting 
human rights and the role of parliament even during emergency rule. The two less 
intrusive levels of emergency rule, the state of alarm and state of emergency, also 
imply a relatively limited change in the balance of powers. The transfer of powers 
to military authorities during a state of siege, however, implies an important, 
although to some extent circumscribed, shift. The Spanish system is nevertheless 
neither as detailed nor as stringent when it comes to protecting the democratic 
institutions as its German equivalent. 
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3.5 The Middle Ground: Finland and United Kingdom 
 
Finland and the United Kingdom share one basic commonality: they provide little 
or no constitutional regulation of emergency powers, the UK for the simple 
reason that it has no written constitution. The Finnish constitution is also silent 
on the issue (as noted in section 2 and in Annex 1), with the important exception 
of guaranteeing certain key rights and freedoms in emergency situations. Both 
states instead have detailed and relatively recent laws on the issue. As we shall see, 
these laws also share some basic features such as detailed definitions of situations 
that can lead to emergency rule, rather sweeping emergency powers, and a 
relatively limited role for parliamentary oversight. They thus fall somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum regarding circumscription of emergency rule. 
 
Two Finnish laws, the Contingency Law and the Law on the State of Defence,47 
provide very detailed regulations to be employed in emergency situations. Loosely 
following the German and the Spanish logic, the two laws provide for two types, 
or degrees, of emergency rule, whereby “exceptional circumstances” is the first, 
and a state of defence the second. This means that during a state of defence, the 
Contingency Law (regulating exceptional circumstances) will also be applicable, 
unless the Law on the State of Defence prescribes otherwise. “Exceptional 
circumstances” are defined in considerable detail. They include war and post-
conflict situations, threat of war (directed at Finland or internationally), serious 
threats to livelihoods or the national economy, and serious accidents. A state of 
defence can be introduced in case of insurgency or war directed at Finland. 
 
In exceptional circumstances as defined by the Contingency Law, the parliament 
can decide to give the government extended powers. If parliament cannot be 
heard without causing serious danger, the president can decide that the 
government be given extended powers, but such a decision must be put to 
parliament within a week, otherwise it lapses. A state of defence is proclaimed by 
the president, a decision which must also be put to parliament within a week. 
Exceptional circumstances and a state of defence can be prolonged by the 
president for a period of one year at a time, but any prolongation must 
immediately be put to parliament. These legislative checks on the proclamation 
and prolongation of emergency rule can be circumvented, however: in both types 
of state of exception, the president can authorise the government to continue 
exercising emergency powers if the situation so requires and parliament has not 
taken a decision within two weeks. 
 
The scope of decision-making powers during exceptional circumstances is wide, 
encompassing large parts of the economy (including for example price controls 
and the distribution of goods), the organisation of public administration, the 
postponement of local elections and the transfer of municipal powers, compulsory 
labour, the confiscation of goods, a duty to submit information to the 
government, etc. Nevertheless, government decisions on such issues must be put 
                                                 
47  Beredskapslagen http://www.finlex.fi/sv/laki/ajantasa/1991/19911080, Lagen om försvarstillstånd 
http://www.finlex.fi/sv/laki/ajantasa/1991/19911083  
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to parliament. During a state of defence government decision-making powers are 
further widened, to include measures aimed at ensuring vital supplies in times of 
war (control over production, strengthened obligation to work, confiscation of 
means of transportation, machinery etc.) and restrictions regarding the freedom of 
expression, assembly and organisation. The laws have so far never been used. 
 
In sum, the Finnish regulations are very detailed, comprising long lists of specific 
measures that the government can take in case of emergency. There are also 
provisions regarding non-derogable human rights. In contrast, parliamentary 
decision-making and oversight can, in certain situations, be circumvented. Finland 
therefore falls somewhere in the middle of the spectrum regarding the scope of 
emergency rule. 
 
The United Kingdom has one of the most recent laws on emergencies, the so-
called Civil Contingencies Act of 2004.48 It replaced the emergency laws which 
dated back more than 50 years and that had proved inadequate during the 
outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2001, the severe flooding in 2000 and the 
fuel protests during the same year.49 The definition of emergency contained in the 
Act is very detailed. It refers to events or situations which threaten to seriously 
damage human welfare or the environment in the whole or parts of the country, 
or war or terrorism that is seriously threatening the country. Damage to human 
welfare and to the environment is further defined to include actual or potential 
loss of human life, human illness or injury, homelessness, damage to property, 
disruption in the supply of basic goods or health services, disruption in 
communication or transport systems, or, in the case of the environment, 
contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radio-active 
substances or disruption or destruction of plant animal life. This is a very broad 
definition of an emergency. Thus, preparatory works and comments stress the 
“Triple Lock” contained in the law: i.e. necessity, proportionality, and seriousness 
must be taken into account when considering emergency powers.50 
 
According to the Civil Contingencies Act, emergency regulations are made by 
“Her Majesty by Order in Council”, i.e. on decision by the government 
proclaimed by the Queen. If such a procedure cannot be followed without serious 
delay, the prime minister or any of the principal secretaries of state or the 
commissioners of the treasury can decide on emergency regulations. These should 
be presented to parliament “as soon as is reasonably practicable”. The regulations 
lapse after seven days unless approved by both Houses of Parliament. The two 
Houses of Parliament can jointly decide to amend or repeal the emergency 
regulations. However, there is an important restriction on legislative oversight: 
nothing in the section of the Act pertaining to parliamentary scrutiny “shall 
                                                 
48  Civil Contingencies Act 2004 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/20040036.htm Relevant in this context is 
mainly Part 2 of that Act, entitled “Emergency Powers”. 
49  Explanatory Notes to Civil Contingencies Act 2004 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2004/2004en36.htm. 
50  Analysts have criticised the “Triple Lock”, however, stressing that it does not emerge clearly from the Act, 
and that none of the three conditions have to be objectively determined (Walker, Clive and James Broderick 
(2006). The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Risk, Resilience and the Law in the United Kingdom Oxford University 
Press. pp.154, 158 and 160. 
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prevent the making of new regulations”. The time limit for emergency regulations 
is 30 days, but, again, this “shall not prevent the making of new regulations”. 
 
According to two analysts of the Civil Contingencies Act, “[t]he regulation-making 
powers are of awesome scope”.51 Emergency regulations can include any 
provision (also in areas normally regulated by law) to prevent, control or mitigate 
an aspect or effect of the emergency. Thus, they can imply confiscation or 
destruction of property, restrictions in the right to free movement and to the 
freedom of assembly, evacuation, and transfer of judicial authorities, including to 
courts set up by the emergency regulations. However, the Human Rights Act 
1998, Part 2 of Civil Contingencies Act, and, to a certain extent, penal law, cannot 
be altered. It is also unlawful to require a person to do military service or prohibit 
participation in industrial action. Moreover, the parliament, the High Court and 
the Court of Session must be able to conduct proceedings in connection with the 
regulations or action taken under the regulations. While the previous legislation 
(the Emergency Powers Act 1920) was used twelve times (with the last time being 
in 1974), Part 2 of the current law has so far never been employed.52 The British 
system is not unlike the Finnish one: detailed on many aspects of decision-making 
powers, but at the same time offering relatively limited parliamentary decision-
making and oversight. 
                                                 
51  Walker and Broderick opt cit., pp. 153, 161-8. 
52  Walker and Broderick opt cit., p. 188. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
This study shows that there are great differences between European states in 
terms of both the extent and content of constitutional regulation of emergency 
situations. Countries with relatively recent experiences of authoritarian rule, such 
as Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and Spain, have constitutional 
regulations on most of the main aspects of emergency rule, while the constitutions 
of – primarily Western European – states such as Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, Norway, and Switzerland are 
almost silent on the topic. Content-wise, differences are also important: according 
to some constitutions, the proclamation, prolongation and termination of 
emergency rule are an executive prerogative, while in others, the role of the 
parliament is important. Similarly, some constitutions allow for considerably 
increased executive prerogatives during a state of emergency, while in others 
hardly any changes in the balance of powers between the executive, the judiciary, 
and the legislature are stipulated. Variations are also considerable as regards the 
extent to which restrictions can be made during states of exception concerning 
human rights and civil liberties. Moreover, the definition of threats varies 
significantly, with some countries solely focused on more “classical” threats to the 
state such as foreign invasions and conventional warfare, while others include 
industrial accidents, natural calamities, or serious threats to the “constitutional 
order”. In contrast, when provided for in national constitutions, safeguards for 
conserving the democratic systems are relatively similar, including the compulsory 
convening of parliament rapidly after a state of exception has been proclaimed, 
the prohibition to dissolve the parliament, the postponement of elections and a 
concomitant prolongation of parliamentary terms. 
 
The case studies presented in this paper show that the constitutions almost never 
– with the notable exception of Germany – contain the complete set of 
regulations applicable during states of exception: as a rule, other pieces of 
legislation as well as non-written practice complement the constitutional 
regulation. The case studies also attest to the fact that in some European 
countries, following thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, emergencies are construed as 
extra-constitutional and unrestrained by law. Thus, the Swiss Government has 
deliberately chosen not to adopt any written rules, constitutional or otherwise, for 
emergencies so as not to hamper the executive in its handling of the crisis. Rather, 
it relies on an extra-constitutional and un-codified “doctrine of necessity”, which 
stipulates that, in a severe emergency, the government may seize almost total 
power, leaving the parliament virtually toothless.  
 
This study, essentially construed as a mapping exercise, leaves many questions 
unanswered. For example, is the type of constitutional government (presidential, 
parliamentary executive, dual executive) in any way related to the way emergency 
rule is regulated? What determines whether emergency regulations are used or not 
in specific emergency situations (e.g. the British anti-terrorist response has not so 
far relied on the Civil Contingencies Act but instead on specific anti-terrorist 
laws)? To what extent do international norms regarding emergency rule have a real 
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impact on national constitution drafting? These and similar questions would 
require further analysis. 
 
 
 
5. Policy Recommendations 
 
Severe crises and emergencies are dangerous periods in the life of a democracy. As 
we have seen, not even a democracy as stable as the Swiss one is shielded from 
danger during a prolonged period of exceptional powers wielded by the 
government. Many analysts agree – and, again, the Swiss case also shows – that 
the most important factor in ensuring the survival of democracy during emergency 
rule is an active, pro-democracy citizenry. This, of course, is not a factor that can 
be created through legislation or constitutional arrangements. 
 
 
In the absence of being able to affect the citizenry, some rules nevertheless seem 
more suitable than others to protect democracy in severe crisis situations.53 These 
are: 
 
• A system of differentiated emergency powers – i.e. a limited form of 
emergency powers for use, for example, in the event of a large scale 
industrial accident or a natural catastrophe; an in-between-version for more 
serious threats to the constitutional order such as a serious terrorist attack 
or an attack on the democratic institutions; and a set of comprehensive 
forms of emergency rules for wartime and similar situations – is arguably 
less prone to political over-reaction than an all-or-nothing system; 
• Stringent rules for the proclamation, prolongation and termination of 
emergency rule, in each case involving the parliament, and indeed larger-
than-normal parliamentary majorities. If it is not possible to convene 
parliament to discuss the proclamation of emergency rule, another formula 
involving several institutions (such as for example the standing committee 
of parliament, the government, the president, and the president of the 
constitutional council) is arguably preferable to a purely executive decision 
(the desirability of avoiding a purely executive decision must however be 
weighed against the necessity to maintain checks and balances); 
• A requirement of periodic prolongations of emergency rule by parliament, 
which gives parliament the chance to regularly and publicly deliberate on 
the necessity to maintain a state of emergency; 
• Provisions for swifter emergency-time legislative processes, rather than 
bypassing parliamentary decision-making entirely; 
                                                 
53  These recommendations focus on those aspects of emergency rules that are not regulated by the ECHR, the 
ICCPR, and other relevant instruments, and that are not treated in The Paris Minimum Standards of Human 
Rights Norms in a State of Emergency of the International Law Association or by the Venice Commission. 
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• A prohibition to dissolve the parliament, a compulsory convening of 
parliament directly after a state of exception has been proclaimed, and the 
prolongation of parliamentary terms until the emergency is over; 
• A strong constitutional protection of the national basic law and other 
fundamental pieces of legislation by prohibiting changes to such 
documents during, as well as just before and just after, a state of exception; 
• The constitutional court and other courts should continue operating under 
their normal rules, and they should be entitled to review regulations, acts, 
and actions of the institutions wielding emergency powers; 
• A strong guarantee of human rights, following the provisions in 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and other relevant mechanisms. 
 
These recommendations have nothing utopian. As this study shows, each 
recommendation is in fact currently adhered to in at least one European  
constitution. Currently, however, no constitution in Europe follows all of them, 
although the German one comes close. 
 
How important is it then to provide constitutional regulation on these issues? As we 
saw in this study, the Norwegian and Finnish constitutions make virtually no 
reference to emergencies, but in other pieces of legislation, quite detailed 
regulations are provided: they are not alone in this in Europe. However, given the 
importance of the changes made to political decision-making, the balance of 
powers and to human rights, it seems important that a strong constitutional 
anchorage is given to the norms regarding emergency rule. 
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Annex 1.  The constitutional regulations of emergencies in EU 
member states, Norway and Switzerland 
N.B. The following tables are designed to summarise the main aspects of the relevant constitutional 
provisions: for detailed and exact wordings, please refer to the constitutional articles cited at the 
bottom of each table. 
Table A2.1  Types of states of exception regulated in European constitutions 
Country Does the constitution contain provisions regarding different types of states of exception? 
Austria 
Only the role of the federal armed forces in protecting the constitutional order and public 
security and in assisting in cases of natural disasters or other serious calamities is 
mentioned, as are the special measures that the federal authorities are entitled to take to 
ensure basic supplies in times of war. 
Belgium Only state of war is mentioned. 
Bulgaria Yes, state of emergency and martial law. 
Cyprus Yes, emergency measures and martial law. 
Czech Republic Only state of war is mentioned. 
Denmark Only a “particularly urgent situation” is mentioned. 
Estonia Yes, emergency, state of emergency and state of war. 
Finland Armed aggression and exceptional circumstances are mentioned in relation to the non-derogability of certain rights and freedoms. 
France Yes, pouvoirs exceptionnels and state of siege. 
Germany Yes, Spannungsfall and Verteidigungsfall. 
Greece Only state of siege is mentioned. 
Hungary Yes, state of danger, state of emergency, state of national crisis, preventive defence emergency and state of war. 
Ireland Yes, public/national emergency and times of war or armed rebellion. 
Italy Only wartime is mentioned. 
Latvia Yes, state of emergency and times of war. 
Lithuania Yes, state of emergency and  martial law. 
Luxemburg Only international crisis is mentioned. 
Malta Only “state of public emergency” is mentioned. 
Netherlands Yes, state of emergency and martial law (the latter in the context of trial for offences). 
Norway Only “extraordinary circumstances” are mentioned, and only to allow the parliament to meet elsewhere than in the capital in such circumstances. 
Poland Yes, state of natural disaster, state of emergency, and war laws. 
Portugal Yes, state of emergency and state of siege. 
Romania Yes, state of emergency, state of siege, war and mobilisation. 
Slovakia Yes, “state of emergency”, “exceptional state” and state of war. 
Slovenia Yes, state of emergency and war. 
Spain Yes, state of alarm, state of exception and state of siege (also called martial law). 
Sweden Only war and danger of war are mentioned. 
Switzerland 
The constitution uses terms such as “serious threats to internal security”, “exceptional 
situations”, “emergency situations”, “catastrophes”, and “disturbances which seriously 
threaten the public order, the external or internal security” without defining any state of 
exception. 
Sources: AT Const. arts. 10.1.15, 55.5; BE Const. arts. 157, 167, 196; BG Const. arts 57.3, 64.2, 84.12, 100.5, 162.2; CH Const. 
arts. 58.2, 61.2, 185.3; CY Const. art. 50 (c); CZ Const. art. 43.1; DE Const. art. 80a, and section Xa; DK Const. arts. 23, 42.7; EE 
Const. arts. 65.14-15, 87.8, 104, 128-131; ES Const. arts. 15, 30.4, 55, 116-117; FI Const. art. 23; FR Const. arts 16, 36; GR Const. 
art. 48; HU Const. arts 8.4, 19, 19/A-E, 28/A, 28/C.5, 35.1-3, 40/B.2; IE Const. arts 15, 24, 28, 38.4.1; IT Const. arts. 27.4, 60, 78, 
87.9, 103.3, 111.7; LT Const. 67.20, 84.17, 140, 142-145, 147; LU Const. art. 32.4; LV Const. arts 62, 73, 82;MT Const. art. 47; NL 
Const. art. 103, 113.4; NO Const. art. 68; PL Const. arts. 228-234; PT Const. art. 19, 134, 138, 140, 161, 164, 172, 179, 197.1; RO 
Const. art. 53, 63.1, 73.3, 83.3, 89.3, 92.1, 93, 115, 152.3; SE Const. chapter 13; SI Const. 16, 81, 92, 103, 108, 116, 126; SK 
Const. 51.2, 102, 119, 129. 
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Table A2.2 Constitutional provisions regarding parliamentary involvement the 
decision to impose emergency rule 
 
Country According to the constitution, which institution decides on the imposition of emergency 
rule and how? 
Austria Not regulated in the constitution. 
Belgium The king decides on a state of war. 
Bulgaria On the request of the president or the government, parliament decides on martial law or state 
of emergency. If parliament is not in session and cannot be convened, the president will 
impose martial law or a state of emergency. Parliament shall immediately be convened to 
approve the decision. 
Cyprus The House of Representatives decides on emergency measures and martial law. However, the 
president and the vice-president, jointly or separately, have a right of veto regarding decisions 
on emergency measures. 
Czech 
Republic 
The Parliament can declare a state of war if the Czech Republic is attacked or in order to meet 
international contractual obligations concerning common defence. 
Denmark Not regulated in the constitution. 
Estonia The government declares an emergency. 
Parliament, on the President’s or the government’s proposal, decides on a state of emergency. 
Such a decision must be taken by a majority of all MPs. 
Parliament, on the President’s proposal, decides on a state of war, except in the case of 
armed aggression, in which case the president shall immediately make such a declaration.  
Finland Not regulated in the constitution. 
France A state of siege is declared by the government. 
The president decides on extraordinary powers, after consultation with the prime minister, the 
presidents of the assemblies and the Constitutional Council. 
Germany The Bundestag decides on a Spannungsfall by a two-thirds majority. The federal government 
can also agree to apply the rules regarding Spannungsfall in the case of international 
contractual obligations. 
The Bundestag decides, by a two-thirds majority (which should include at least a majority of 
all MPs), to impose a state of defence, on the proposal of the federal government. Such a 
decision requires the approval of the Bundesrat. 
If immediate action is needed and the Bundestag cannot be convened or if quorum cannot be 
attained, the Joint Committee can decide by a two-thirds majority (which should include at 
least a majority of all its members), to impose a state of defence. 
If, during an armed aggression, the above state institutions cannot immediately declare a state 
of defence, it shall be considered as having been proclaimed at the point when the aggression 
started. 
Greece Parliament decides, by a three-fifths majority of all MPs, to impose a state of siege, on 
proposal of the government. If parliament is not in session and it is objectively impossible to 
convene it in time, the president, on proposal of the government, can decide on a state of 
siege. In the latter case, such a decree must in all circumstances, even if parliament has been 
dissolved, be approved by it within 15 days: such a decision is taken by absolute majority. 
Hungary Parliament decides on a state of emergency, state of national crisis, preventive defence 
emergency, or state of war by two-thirds majority of all MPs (in the case of preventive defence 
emergency, two-thirds of MPs present). 
If parliament is prevented from taking such a decision (because it cannot be convened due to a 
lack of time or due to the emergency itself), the president can introduce a state of 
emergency, state of national crisis or state of war. The speaker of parliament, the chairperson 
of the constitutional court and the prime minister decide together whether the president 
should be entitled to take such a decision. In its first session, parliament shall decide, by two 
thirds majority of all MPs, upon the legality and necessity of the decision. 
Ireland Both chambers of parliament decide whether there is a “national emergency”; not further 
regulated in the constitution. 
Italy Not regulated in the constitution. 
Latvia The government proclaims a state of emergency. Such a decision shall immediately be put to 
the parliament. 
Lithuania Parliament can itself decide on a state of emergency and on martial law. 
The president can also, in accordance with law, proclaim a state of emergency and put it 
before parliament at its next session. 
In the case of armed aggression, the president shall establish martial law in the whole or parts 
of the country. The decision shall be put before parliament, which, if not in session, shall 
immediately be convened. 
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Luxemburg Not regulated in the constitution. 
Malta The president can declare a state of public emergency. 
The parliament can also declare a state of public emergency by a two-thirds majority of all 
MPs, by stating that the democratic institutions are threatened by subversion. 
Netherlands A state of emergency is declared by royal decree. Immediately after the declaration both 
chambers of parliament, in joint session, shall determine the duration of the state of 
emergency.  
Norway Not regulated in the constitution. 
Poland The president imposes martial law or a state of emergency at the request of the government. 
This decision has to be presented to the Sejm within 48 hours. An absolute majority of votes 
taken in the presence of at least half the statutory number of MPs, may annul the President’s 
decision. 
The government decides whether to declare a state of natural disaster. 
Portugal The president imposes a state of emergency or a state of siege after conferring with the 
government and gaining the permission of parliament. If parliament is not in session and 
cannot be immediately convened, its Standing Committee decides in its place. In such a case, 
parliament shall approve the decision as soon as it can be convened. The proclamation of a 
state of emergency or a state of siege must be counter-signed by the government. 
Romania The president declares a state of emergency or a state of siege in accordance with the law, 
and must seek the parliament’s approval of the measures within five days. 
Slovakia The president declares a state of emergency or a state of war on proposal of the government, 
which should take its decision collectively. 
Slovenia Parliament declares a state of emergency on proposal of the government. If parliament cannot 
be convened, the president will decide on the proclamation of a state of emergency. When 
parliament is next in session the proclamation shall immediately be put before it for approval. 
Spain The government decides on a state of alarm by decree. The lower house of parliament shall be 
immediately notified and shall convene without delay. 
The government declares a state of emergency by decree, after approval by the lower house of 
parliament. The authorisation shall include provisions regarding effects, time-limits, and the 
geographical scope of the state of emergency. 
At the proposal of the government, the lower house of parliament declares a state of siege by 
absolute majority. 
Sweden A state of war can only be declared with the consent of the Riksdag, except if there is an 
armed attack on the country. 
Switzerland The government takes decisions regarding the internal security. 
 
Sources: BE Const. art. 167.1; BG Const. arts. 84.12 and 100.5; CH Const. art. 185.2; CY Const. art. 50 (c); CZ Const. art. 43.1; DE 
Const. arts. 80a.1-3; 115a.1-4; EE Const. arts. 65.14-15, 87.8, 128, 129; ES Const. art. 116.2-4; FR Const. arts. 16, 36; GR Const. 
art. 48.1-2, 6; HU Const. arts. 19.3, 19/A.1-4; IE Const. 28.3; LT Const. arts. 67.20, 84, 142, 144; LV Const. art. 62; MT Const. art. 
47.2; NL Const. art. 103; PL Const. arts. 229, 230.1, 231 and 232; PT Const. arts. 134 d, 138.1-2, 140, 161, 179.3-4, 197.1f; RO 
Const. art. 93.1; SE Const. chapter 10 art. 9; SI Const. art. 92; SK Const. arts. 102.1m, 119n 
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Table A2.3  Constitutional provisions regarding parliamentary involvement in 
decisions to prolong and terminate emergency rule 
 
Country According to the constitution, which institution decides on the prolongation and 
termination of emergency rule, and how? 
Austria Not regulated in the constitution. 
Belgium The king states that hostilities are ended. Not further regulated in the constitution. 
Bulgaria Not regulated in the constitution. 
Cyprus Not regulated in the constitution. 
Czech Republic Not regulated in the constitution. 
Denmark Not regulated in the constitution. 
Estonia There is a maximum time limit of three months for a state of emergency. Not further 
regulated in the constitution. 
Finland Not regulated in the constitution. 
France There is a time limit of 12 days for a state of siege; it can be prolonged by parliament. Not 
further regulated in the constitution. 
Germany A Spannungsfall is terminated whenever the Bundestag so decides. A Verteidigungsfall is 
terminated whenever the Bundestag, with the approval of the Bundesrat, so decides. The 
Bundesrat can demand that the Bundestag deliberate on the issue of termination.  
Greece There is a maximum time limit of 15 days for a state of siege. It can be prolonged for 15-day 
periods by parliamentary decision, taken by absolute majority. 
Hungary Not regulated in the constitution. 
Ireland The parliament decides when a public emergency or a time of war or armed rebellion shall 
cease. 
Italy Not regulated in the constitution. 
Latvia Not regulated in the constitution. 
Lithuania There is a time limit of six months for a state of emergency. Not further regulated in the 
constitution. 
Luxemburg Not regulated in the constitution. 
Malta There is a time limit of 14 days for a state of public emergency, which can be prolonged by 
the parliament for up to three months at a time. If parliament has, through a resolution, 
concluded that the democratic institutions are threatened by subversion, the time limit is 
12 months.  
Netherlands In a joint session, the chambers decide on the time limit for a state of emergency. Such a 
decision is taken immediately after a state of emergency has been declared by royal decree 
and whenever the chambers find it necessary. A state of emergency can also be terminated 
by royal decree. 
Norway Not regulated in the constitution. 
Poland The time limit for a state of natural disaster is 30 days; for a state of emergency, it is 90 
days. A state of emergency can be prolonged only once for a maximum of 60 days with the 
permission of the Sejm. A state of natural disaster can also be prolonged with the 
permission of the Sejm. 
Portugal The time limit for both a state of emergency and a state of siege is 15 days, except in war 
when the time limit is determined by law. Both types of states of exception can be 
prolonged. 
Romania Not regulated in the constitution. 
Slovakia The president, on proposal of the government, decides when a state of emergency or a state 
of was shall come to an end. 
Slovenia Not regulated in the constitution. 
Spain The time limit for a state of alarm is 15 days; for a state of emergency, it is 30 days. 
Congress decides on time limits for a state of siege. A state of alarm can be prolonged by 
Congress. A state of emergency can be prolonged for another 30 days, following the same 
procedure as for the proclamation of a state of emergency. 
Sweden Not regulated in the constitution. 
Switzerland Not regulated in the constitution. 
 
Sources: BE Const. art. 167.1; DE Const. arts. 80 a.2, 115 l.2; EE Const. art. 129; ES Const. art. 116.2-4; FR Const. art. 36; GR 
Const. art. 48.1, 3-6; HU Const. IE Const. art. 28.3.3; LT Const. art. 144; MT Const. art. 47.3-4; NL Const. art. 103.3; PL Const. 
arts. 230.1-2, 232; PT Const. art. 19.5; SK Const. art. 102.1m 
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Table A2.4 Effects of state of exception on the role of parliament and of courts 
 
Country How, according to the constitution, do emergency powers affect the balance between 
parliament, government and head of state? How is the role of the courts affected? 
Austria Military jurisdiction can be established in times of war. 
Belgium Military tribunals are set up in times of war. Their organisation, jurisdiction, duration, and 
the rights and duties of the members of the court are established by law. 
Bulgaria In an emergency, a Grand National Assembly shall take on the functions of the parliament. 
The Grand National Assembly has 400 deputies, while parliament has 240. 
Cyprus Not regulated in the constitution. 
Czech Republic Not regulated in the constitution. 
Denmark If parliament cannot be convened, the King (in practice the government) can issue 
provisional laws. These must be in conformity with the constitution, and shall be put before 
the parliament as soon as it is in session again. 
Estonia Not regulated in the constitution. 
Finland Not regulated in the constitution. 
France “Extraordinary powers” presume that the democratic institutions are at least partially 
disrupted. Not further regulated in the constitution. 
Germany When a state of defence is promulgated, the power of command over the armed forces 
passes to the Federal Chancellor. 
Bills submitted as urgent by the federal government shall be forwarded to the Bundesrat at 
the same time as they are submitted to the Bundestag. The Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
shall debate such bills together without delay.  
During a state of defence, the Joint Committee (Gemeinsame Ausschuss) can determine 
with a two- thirds majority of the votes cast (including at least the majority of its 
members), that insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely assembly of the Bundestag or 
that there is no quorum in the Bundestag. As a consequence, the Joint Committee shall have 
the status of both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat and shall exercise their rights as one 
body. Statutes adopted by the Joint Committee lapse not later than six months after the 
termination of a state of defence. 
During a state of defence, the federation has the right to legislate concurrently even on 
matters that normally come within the legislative powers of the Länder. Such statutes 
require the consent of the Bundesrat. 
During a state of defence, the federal government can also issue instructions to Land 
governments and to Land authorities. In extreme and clearly delimited cases, the Land 
governments are authorised to issue instructions in the place of the federal government. 
The Federation is entitled to establish federal military criminal courts for the armed forces. 
These can exercise criminal jurisdiction during a state of defence. The highest court of 
justice for appeals is nevertheless the Federal Court of Justice. 
Greece On proposal of the government, the president may issue acts of legislative content to deal 
with the emergency. Such acts shall be submitted to parliament within 15 days after 
issuance/after the convening of parliament. If they are not submitted to parliament within 
the time limit, or if parliament does not ratify them within 15 days, they lapse. 
Extraordinary courts are established during a state of siege. 
Hungary During a state of preventive defence emergency, the government can introduce measures 
that derogate from the acts governing the administrative system and the operation of the 
Hungarian armed forces and the law enforcement agencies; such measures cannot last for 
more than 60 days, and the government shall continuously inform the president and the 
competent parliamentary committees concerning the measures. 
During a state of danger and a state of preventive defence emergency, the government, if 
authorised to do so by parliament, may issue decrees and pass resolutions that derogate 
from existing law.  
During a state of emergency, the president introduces emergency measures, which are 
defined in a separate law, by decree. S/he shall immediately inform the speaker of 
parliament of any such emergency measures. The parliament, or the parliamentary defence 
committee, has the right to suspend emergency measures introduced by the president. They 
remain in force for a period of 30 days, unless the parliament or, should the parliament be 
obstructed, the parliamentary defence committee, extends their validity. 
In severe emergencies, a National Defence Council is established. It is chaired by the 
president, and is composed of: the speaker of parliament, the floor leaders of the political 
parties represented in parliament, the prime minister, the ministers, and the chief of staff 
of the armed forces with the right of consultation. During a state of martial law, the 
National Defence Council decides on the use of the armed forces and on the deployment of 
foreign armed forces in Hungary. It also decides on the introduction of emergency measures 
as defined in a separate law. 
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The National Defence Council exercises the powers of the president and the government, as 
well as the powers transferred to it by the Parliament. 
The National Defence Council may pass decrees, which may suspend the application of 
certain laws or which may deviate from the provisions of certain laws. Furthermore, it may 
take other extraordinary measures, but may not, however, suspend the application of the 
Constitution. 
Decrees passed by the National Defence Council shall lose validity upon cessation of the 
state of national crisis, unless the Parliament extends their validity 
Ireland In a public emergency, the time of deliberation of the Senate can be shortened (except for 
proposals regarding changes in the constitution). If its decisions oppose those of the House 
of Representatives, they can, in certain circumstances, be overrun. Such laws have a 
validity of 90 days, unless both chambers agree on a longer period of validity. 
Military tribunals may be established to deal with a state of war or armed rebellion. 
Italy In times of war, the parliament assigns the necessary powers to the government. 
The scope of jurisdiction of military tribunals in times of war is decided by law. The right to 
appeal sentences of the military tribunals can be restricted. 
Latvia The jurisdiction of military tribunals is extended in times of war and during a state of 
emergency. 
Lithuania Not regulated in the constitution. 
Luxemburg During an international crisis, the Grand Duke may, in urgent cases, issue regulations, 
including such regulations that diverge from existing law.  
Malta Not regulated in the constitution. 
Netherlands According to the constitution, the consequences of a state of emergency shall be 
determined by law. In addition, the constitution stipulates that a declaration of a state of 
emergency may depart from the provisions of the Constitution relating to the powers of the 
executive bodies of the provinces, municipalities and water boards (waterschappen). 
Norway Not regulated in the constitution. 
Poland The principles regulating the activity of organs of public authority during all three states of 
exception shall be established by statute. Whenever, under martial law, the parliament 
cannot be convened, if the government submits an application, the president can issue 
regulations with the force of law. Such regulations must be approved by parliament at its 
next session. 
Extraordinary courts or summary procedures may only be established during times of war. 
Portugal Declarations of a state of siege or a state of emergency must not affect the application of 
the constitutional rules concerning the responsibilities and functioning of the bodies that 
exercise sovereign power or of the self-government bodies of the autonomous regions. 
During states of war, court martials with jurisdiction over crimes of a strictly military 
nature shall be established. 
Romania Parliament may pass a special law enabling the Government to issue ordinances in particular 
fields during a set period of time, outside the scope of organic laws. If the enabling law so 
stipulates, ordinances shall be submitted to Parliament for approval. The Government can 
only adopt emergency ordinances in exceptional cases, the regulation of which cannot be 
postponed, and have the obligation to give the reasons for the emergency status. An 
emergency ordinance only comes into force after it has been submitted for debate in an 
emergency procedure to the Chamber, and after it has been published in due order. If, 
within 30 days, the notified Chamber does not pronounce itself on the ordinance, it is 
deemed to have been adopted and is sent to the other Chamber, for a similar emergency 
procedure.  
Emergency ordinances cannot be adopted in the field of constitutional laws, or affect the 
status of fundamental institutions of the State, the rights, freedoms and duties stipulated in 
the constitution, the electoral rights, and cannot establish steps for transferring assets to 
public property forcibly.  
Slovakia The president shall dissolve parliament during war, a war state or exceptional state. 
The manner of exercising public authority during war, a state of war, and an exceptional 
state, shall be laid down by a constitutional law. 
Slovenia If parliament cannot be convened due to a state of emergency or war, the president may, 
on proposal of the government, issue decrees with the force of law. Such decrees may, in 
exceptional circumstances and in accordance with the constitution, restrict certain rights 
and freedoms. When parliament is next in session such decrees shall immediately be put 
before it for approval. 
Military tribunals cannot be established in peacetime. 
Spain The law shall make provisions for the exercise of military jurisdiction strictly within the 
military framework and in cases of a state of siege (martial law), in accordance with the 
principles of the Constitution.  Courts of exception are prohibited. 
See also Table A2.5. 
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Sweden During war or the threat of war, a War Delegation appointed from among the members of 
the Riksdag replaces the Riksdag if necessary. The order instructing the War Delegation to 
replace the Riksdag is issued by the members of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs after 
consultation with the prime minister, if possible. If war conditions prevent the Council from 
convening, the order is issued by the Government. In case of a threat of war, the order is 
issued jointly by the members of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs and the prime 
minister. 
If neither the Riksdag nor the War Delegation is in a position to carry out its duties, the 
Government shall assume its powers to protect the country and bring hostilities to an end.  
If the government cannot carry out its duties due to war, the Riksdag can decide on the 
formation of a new government and determine its working procedures. 
During war or the threat of war, the Government can, with authority in law, issue 
regulations on matters which otherwise, according to the constitution, should be laid down 
in an act of law. 
Switzerland The government may, during disturbances that seriously threaten public order or the 
external or internal security, take decisions or issue regulations to come to terms with the 
situation. Such regulations must be temporary. 
Exceptional tribunals are forbidden. 
 
Sources: AT Const. art 84; BE Const. art. 157; BG Const. arts. 63, 157; CH Const. arts. 30.1, 185.3; DE Const. arts. 115b, c.1, d.2, 
e.1, f.1, k.2, i, 96.2-3; DK Const. art.23; EE Const. ES Const. art. 117.5; FR Const. GR Const. art 48.1, 5; HU Const. arts. 19/B.1-5, 
19/C.2-4, 35.1.m, 3; IE Const. arts. 24.1-3, 38.4.1; IT Const. arts. 78, 103.3, 111.7; LT Const. LU Const. art. 32.4; LV Const. NL 
Const. art. 103.1-2; PL Const. arts. 175.2, 228.3, 234; PT Const. arts. 19.7, 213; RO Const. SE Const. chapter 13, arts. 2-6; SI 
Const. arts. 108, 126; SK Const. art. 102.1e, 3 
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Table A2.5  Constitutional safeguards for the survival of the democratic system 
 
Country What constitutional mechanisms exist to ensure the survival of the democratic order? 
Austria Not regulated in the constitution. 
Belgium The constitution cannot be altered in times of war or when the two parliamentary chambers 
are incapable of convening freely on federal territory. 
Bulgaria If there is war or another emergency situation when the term of the parliament has ended 
or is about to end, it will be prolonged until the situation improves. 
Cyprus Not regulated in the constitution. 
Czech Republic Not regulated in the constitution. 
Denmark Not regulated in the constitution. 
Estonia During times of war or a state of emergency, no parliamentary, presidential or local 
elections may be held. The powers of these institutions cannot be curtailed, and their terms 
are automatically prolonged until three months after the end of the state of emergency or 
the war.  
Finland Not regulated in the constitution. 
France The parliament sits “as of right”. The National Assembly cannot be dissolved while the 
president is exercising his/her extraordinary powers. 
Germany The Joint Committee (i.e. the “mini-parliament” that can replace the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat during a state of defence) cannot change the constitution and is not entitled to 
transfer powers to an international organisation. The Bundestag, with the approval of the 
Bundesrat, can at any point in time repeal laws issued by the Joint Committee. 
Measures by the Joint Committee or the federal government to avoid danger can be 
repealed by the decision of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. 
The Constitutional Court shall continue to function normally, except in cases where the 
Court itself decides that its working methods must be adjusted to the situation. 
Terms of the Bundestag, the president, the parliaments of the Länder, and the judges of the 
Constitutional Court shall be prolonged until six months (nine months for the president) 
after the end of the state of defence. 
The Bundestag cannot be dissolved during a state of defence. 
Greece During a war, the terms of the president and parliament are prolonged until the end of the 
conflict. If parliament has been dissolved, new elections shall be postponed until the end of 
the war, and, in the meantime, parliament is re-convened. 
Hungary During a state of emergency or a state of national crisis, parliament cannot be dissolved, 
and its term shall be prolonged until the end of the emergency situation. The parliament or, 
should the parliament be obstructed, the parliamentary defence committee shall remain in 
session during a state of emergency. 
In case of war, the risk of war or in an emergency situation, the president can reconvene 
the parliament if it has been dissolved. The parliament itself shall decide on the 
prolongation of its term. 
In a national crisis, the activities of the Constitutional Court may not be restricted. 
Ireland In the case of invasion, the House of Representatives (Dáil Éireann) shall be convened as 
soon as it is possible to do so in practical terms, if it is not already in session. 
However, the constitution is practically suspended in the case of war or armed rebellion: 
“Nothing in this Constitution other than Article 15.5.2° [which forbids parliament to 
introduce the death penalty] shall be invoked to invalidate any law enacted by [the 
parliament] which is expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public safety and the 
preservation of the State in time of war or armed rebellion, or to nullify any act done or 
purporting to be done in time of war or armed rebellion in pursuance of any such law”. 
Italy In wartime, the terms of both chambers can be extended by law. 
Latvia Not regulated in the constitution. 
Lithuania If general elections fall during a war, the Seimas or the president shall decide that the 
Seimas’, the president’s, or the local governments’ terms shall be prolonged. In such cases, 
elections must be called within three months after the end of the war. 
During a state of emergency or martial law, the constitution cannot be altered. 
Luxemburg No paragraph of the constitution can be temporarily suspended. 
Malta If parliament is not in session, it shall be convened within five days after a state of public 
emergency has been proclaimed, and thereafter remain in session. 
If Malta is at war, the parliamentary term can be prolonged by 12-month periods, not 
exceeding a total of five years. 
Netherlands Not regulated in the constitution. 
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Norway Not regulated in the constitution. 
Poland When extraordinary measures are in place, the constitution, the election laws, and the laws 
regulating the extraordinary measures cannot be changed. During and for 90 days after such 
a period, the term of the Sejm cannot be abrogated, and no elections or referenda may be 
held: terms are thus prolonged if necessary. 
Portugal Parliament cannot be dissolved during a state of emergency or a state of siege, and the 
constitution may not be changed. 
Only parliament can legislate regarding a state of emergency and state of siege. 
Romania Parliament cannot be dissolved during a state of emergency, a state of siege, war or 
mobilisation. Its term is prolonged de jure until the crisis (of whatever type) is over. 
If parliament is not in session, it shall be convened de jure within 48 hours after a state of 
emergency or a state of siege has been introduced, and within 24 hours in case of 
mobilisation or war. Parliament shall remain in session during the whole period of crisis (of 
whatever type). 
The presidential term can be prolonged by organic law in case of war or catastrophe. 
The constitution cannot be altered during a state of emergency, a state of siege or war. 
Slovakia The Constitutional Court shall examine whether the proclamation of a state of emergency or 
an exceptional state as well as decisions taken in conjunction therewith are in accordance 
with the constitution and constitutional law. 
Slovenia If the parliamentary or presidential term comes to an end during a war or a state of 
exception, its term shall be prolonged until six months after the end of the war/state of 
emergency, or, as concerns the parliament, earlier if parliament so decides. 
Spain Parliament cannot be dissolved during a state of alarm, a state of emergency or a state of 
siege. If parliament is not in session, it shall be convened. Its functioning, as well as that of 
the other constitutional state authorities, may not be interrupted. If parliament has been 
dissolved or its term has expired before the emergency occurred, its powers are assumed by 
its Permanent Deputation. 
None of the exceptional states will affect the principle of liability of the Government or 
government agents. 
The constitution cannot be altered during a state of alarm, a state of emergency, or a state 
of siege. 
Sweden In case of war or danger of war, the Riksdag shall be convened. 
If neither the Riksdag nor the War Delegation is able to carry out its duties, the government 
assumes its powers to the extent necessary to protect the country. In such a case, the 
government may not enact, amend, or abrogate a fundamental law, the Riksdag Act, or a 
law on elections for the Riksdag. 
If the case of war, elections for the Riksdag are held only if the Riksdag so determines. In 
the case of danger of war, the Riksdag may decide to defer elections. Such a decision must 
be reviewed at intervals of no more than one year. Decisions regarding postponement of 
elections are valid only if supported by at least three fourths of the members of the 
Riksdag. 
Elections for the Riksdag or local government assemblies cannot be held in occupied 
territory. 
Switzerland Not regulated in the constitution. 
 
Sources: BE Const. art. 196; BG Const. art. 64; DE Const. arts. 115 e.2, 115 g, 115 h.1-3, 115 l.1; EE Const. art. 131.1-2; ES Const. 
arts. 116.5-6, 169; FR Const. art. 16; GR Const. arts. 30.4, 53.3; HU Const. arts. 19/B.6, 28/A.1-3; IE Const. art. 28.3.2-3; IT Const. 
art. 60; LT Const.  arts. 143, 147; LU Const. art. 113; MT Const. arts. 47.3.a, 76.3; PL Const. art. 228.6-7; PT Const. arts. 164 e, 
172.1, 289; RO Const. 63.1, 83.3, 89.3, 92.1, 93.2, 152.3; SE Const. chapter 13, arts. 1, 5, 10, 12; SI Const. arts. 81, 103; SK Const. 
129.6. 
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